

# Putin 3.0 ?



## Companies of the holding:



PR-agency «New Image». Since 1993



International Institute for Political  
Expertise (IIPE). Since 2003




Government Relations agency  
«Minchenko GR Consulting». Since  
2007

## Our projects geography


- Belarus;
- Georgia;
- European Union;
- Kazakhstan;
- Kyrgyzstan;
- Moldova;
- USA;
- Uzbekistan;
- Ukraine;
- Turkmenistan;
- Regions of Russian Federation: Republic of Bashkortostan, Sakha, Tatarstan, Udmurtia, Khakassia, Krasnoyarsk, Perm, Primorye, Amur, Arkhangelsk, Volgograd, Irkutsk, Kirov, Kurgan, Leningrad, Magadan, Moscow, Novgorod, Orenburg, Pskov, Samara, Sverdlovsk, Tver, Tyumen, Nizhni Novgorod, Chelyabinsk , the Yamal- Nenets autonomous region, the Chukotka autonomous region, the Khanty-Mansi autonomous region, Saint-Petersburg and Moscow..







- Graduate of Chelyabinsk State University in History (1993), Russian Academy of State Service in Political Psychology (1997).
- In 1993 began career as a political consultant.
- 2004-2011 - advisor to the Chairman of State Duma Anti-Corruption Committee, expert of Security and CIS Countries Committees;
- Since 2010 to 2012 - member of Public Council in the Ministry of Industry and Trade and Expert Council of the Ministry of Economic Development. Since 2014 - member of Public Council in the Ministry of Energy.
- Board member of Russian Association of political consultants. Member of IAPC (International Association of Political Consultants).
- Rated TOP-10 & TOP-20 among Russian political consultants (according to “Vedomosti” newspaper & “Obschaya Gazeta”).
- First place for Minchenko consulting in the rank of major players in Russian political consulting (according to “Kompaniya” magazine, 2011).
- First place in popularity among political analysts rated by Russian journalists (survey of Znak.com, 2013).
- Moscow State University, Faculty of World Politics, Lecturer.
- Author of 2 books.



# Ukrainian crisis

## Approval of Crimea decision in Russia

WCIOM. February 2015:

Poll Question. Reunification with Crimea is for better for Russia?

Yes (all population) – **69%**

Yes (Moscow and Saint-Petersburg) – **82%**



WCIOM

Sociological sample – 1600  
Total population – 2,5 million  
February 2015:

Number of people who support  
reunification — **90%**  
Number of people against  
reunification — 5%  
Number of Crimean tatars only  
who support reunification – 49%  
Number of Crimean tatars only  
against reunification – 25%

GfK Ukraine.

Research project Free Crimea  
January-February 2015:

Number of people who support  
reunification — **93%**  
Number of people against  
reunification — 4%





How do Russians get knowledge about Ukraine?

- Mass media;
- Relatives (for about 30% of Russian families have relatives in the Ukraine);
- Refuges (approximately 1 million all over the country) and migrants.


Turning point in the attitude of common Russians to the Ukrainian revolutionary or coup events - Odessa tragedy May 2, 2014, when more than 40 people were burned to death. No one has been punished.





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Economy

State of the Union Address 2015:  
«Russia is isolated, with its economy in  
tatters»



CNN interview 1 February 2015:  
«And since Mr. Putin made this decision around Crimea and Ukraine, not because of some grand strategy, but essentially because he was caught off balance by the protests in the Maidan, and Yanukovych then fleeing after we'd brokered a deal to transition power in Ukraine. Since that time this improvisation that he's been doing has getting - has gotten him deeper and deeper into a situation that is a violation of international law»

## Speech by Obama in Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 2014

«And yet there is a pervasive unease in our world -- a sense that the very forces that have brought us together have created new dangers and made it difficult for any single nation to insulate itself from global forces. As we gather here, an outbreak of Ebola overwhelms public health systems in West Africa and threatens to move rapidly across borders. Russian aggression in Europe recalls the days when large nations trampled small ones in pursuit of territorial ambition. The brutality of terrorists in Syria and Iraq forces us to look into the heart of darkness».

How it was understood in Russia?

Russia – is a threat №2 to the world (in between Ebola and ISIS)



About an impact of sanctions and counter-sanctions on Russian economy:

- Few industries won (agriculture, metallurgy, oil and gas);
- Crisis now is less formidable than in 1998 and 2009;
- An unemployment level is the lowest in the history.

FOM (Last - November 2014)

Blue line – no matter

Red line – negative

Green line - positive


### Лично вы относитесь к Америке хорошо, плохо или безразлично?

i Параметры опроса

ДАННЫЕ В % ОТ ОПРОШЕННЫХ



КАК ВЫ В ЦЕЛОМ ОТНОСИТЕСЬ СЕЙЧАС К США?



В %; N=1600

Левада-Центр, 21-24 ноября 2014 г.

FOM (Last - November 2014)  
 Blue line – positive  
 Red line – negative

КАК ВЫ В ЦЕЛОМ ОТНОСИТЕСЬ СЕЙЧАС К СОЕДИНЕННЫМ ШТАТАМ АМЕРИКИ?

	январь.14	7-10 марта 2014	21-24 марта 2014	май.14	июль.14	сентябрь.14	<b>ноябрь.14</b>
очень хорошо	2	2	1	3	2	1	<b>1</b>
в основном хорошо	41	32	25	15	16	16	<b>17</b>
в основном плохо	36	44	41	40	34	43	<b>42</b>
очень плохо	8	12	20	31	40	30	<b>32</b>
затрудняюсь ответить	13	10	13	11	9	10	<b>9</b>




WCIOM (Last - November 2014)

Blue line – positive

Red line – negative

What is your general attitude towards the US

	91 г.	98 г.	00 г.	01 г.	02 г.	03 г.	VI.08 г.	IX.08 г.	09 г.	10 г.	11 г.	12 г.	II.13 г.	VIII.13 г.	XI.14 г.
INDEX*															
100 – very good															
-100 – very bad	79	51	16	38	20	8	20	-43	13	32	26	21	25	11	-44



# Assasination of Nemtsov



How does it look like when we are facing political assassination in the post soviet countries?

- ❑ Disguised as suicide (sometimes intentionally ridiculous, 2 shot in the head) - Kirpa, Kravchenko in Ukraine;
- ❑ Disguised as an accident (gas poisoning, shot on the hunt) - Zhvania in Georgia, Kushnarev in Ukraine;
- ❑ May be accompanied by compromising context.

All of these cases remain unsolved.



Mass actions in honor of Boris Nemtsov not evidence of his high popularity as a politician.




It is difficult to suspect the Russians in the mass support of the Polish President Kaczynski. However, after his death in a plane crash in 2010, thousands of Muscovites brought flowers to the Polish Embassy.



Why Nemtsov was comfortable for the authorities?

- ❑ Personally known and understandable;
- ❑ Ready to compromise (an example - protesters rally in 2011-2012);
- ❑ Took part in the regional elections. Became a part of the system;
- ❑ Had high anti rating.



What really matters in a context of domestic politics




- ❑ Return of gubernatorial elections;
- ❑ Changing the system of parliamentary elections (half of 450 State Duma in 2016 will be elected by single-member districts, half by proportional party representation);
- ❑ Liberalization of the order of political parties registration (introduces during presidency of D. Medvedev, implemented by Putin).

30 campaigns for elections of governors were held in September of 2014.

At least 4 regions were toss-up.

- Krasnoyarsk
- Murmansk
- Altay
- Yakutia





Over the past 2 years the opposition won the elections of mayors in several major Russian cities. Among them - the third largest city in the country - Novosibirsk, where the representative of the Communist Party beat United Russia party candidate.



**Mayor of Novosibirsk** (informal capital of Siberia) 2014:

Anatoly Lokot' (Communist Party) - 43,75 %

Vladimir Znatkov (United Russia) - 39,5%

Turnout - 31,4 %



**Mayor of Ekaterinburg** (informal capital of Ural) 2013:

Evgeniy Roizman (Civic Platform Party) - 33,31%

Yakov Silin (United Russia) - 29,71%

Turnout - 29,77%



**Mayor of Petrozavodsk** (Karelia) 2013:

Galina Shirshina (supported by social-democratic «Yabloko» party) - 41,9%

Incumbent Nikolay Levin (United Russia) – 28,9%



Turnout - 26,3%

«Patriots of Russia» led by the 1990-s entrepreneur and regional legislature deputy M. Bykov were close to total victory in the elections of Krasnoyarsk City Council in 2013. Only an unexpected coalition between United Russia and Civic Platform Party stopped them.



Krasnoyarsk City Council members:

- «Patriots of Russia» -14
- United Russia -12
- Fair Russia Party - 5
- Civic Platform Party - 4
- Communist Party -1



**Ostrovskiy** (Smolensk) – Liberal-democratic party;

**Belykh** (Kirov) – Ex Union of Right Forces (SPS);


**Potomsky** (Orel) – Communist Party;

**Ilkovsky** (Zabaykalskiy region) – Fair Russia.



M. Prokhorov is leaving its political project again.


Now the party Civic Platform Party was abandon.



Putin's plan is to refresh political elite:

- Grassroots movement;
- Municipal elections.





### Guidelines of Presidential Administration:

- Competitiveness;
- Transparency;
- Legitimacy.



Aim is to stand on the side of the majority. This is determine special request for quality public opinion polls.

There are 3 independent sources of sociological data:



FOM



WCIOM



Federal service  
of guard





The dismissal of governors (Chelyabinsk, Novosibirsk and Bryansk regions).

Arrest and dismissal of the governor of Sakhalin.



Polls by LEVADA-CENTRE

**March 2015: 72–73%**

2012-2014 years: 52–60%



Polls by WCIOM

**March 2015: 88%**



Polls by FOM (% of trust)

Absolutely trust – 40%

Rather trust – 46%

**Overall trust – 86%**



## Polls by LEVADA-CENTRE

Putin's reelection - **57%**

New guy in Kremlin - 25%

## Polls by FOM

Putin's reelection - **75%**



Polls by FOM (% of trust for Prime-minister)

Rather trust – **46%**

Polls by WCIOM (% of trust for Government)

**68,5%**

Polls by WCIOM (% of trust for Prime-minister)

**68,9%**



WCIOM – March 2015

March. 22, 2015

United Russia	<b>57.3</b>
Communist Party	6.1
Liberal Democrats	7.8
Fair Russia	4.1
Other	2.6
No answer	7.1

FOM – March 2015


United Russia – **59%**



"People with pretty faces"



«Anchovies»



# Myths about Putin





## Myth 1. Putin is a dictator

In reality he is very attentive to public opinion.



## Myth 2. Putin is a Russian nationalist

In reality he is a successor of Soviet national policy and checks and balances style.



### Myth 3. Putin is an anti-western politician

In reality he thinks about himself as a most pro-western politician in all the Russian history.



Myth 4. After Crimea Russian-western relations changed dramatically and it was a decision point


In reality the decision to be ready for the conflict was made by Putin's Politburo much earlier - in 2012.



## Myth 5. Putin is a businessman and his inner circle is as well

In reality Putin is a true believer. He thinks about values and his place in the history.


His imperative - to keep Russia safe.





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## Politburo 2.0

### Eltsin's balance of power



- Family;
- Oligarchs (7 bankers);
- Gazprom;
- Moscow group;
- National republics;
- Siloviki;
- Liberal clan.






- ❑ Politburo 2.0 works as a network structure. It is an informal agency and there is no formalization of its functions, such as general meetings.
- ❑ Sectoral branches are distributed among its members, who offer their management schemes within their competence.




- ❑ This is the model of resource redistribution and preservation of stable elite groups, and the future consolidation of these groups' governance system.
- ❑ **The key persons** – Politburo 2.0 members - do not fall out of the Putin orbit. These people remain as the key decision makers in the Government. There is staff turnover in the Government, such as in the regions, but the Politburo 2.0 holds the levers of control tightly.


**Putin's team: stages of formation and self-determination**




**Groups merged with the Putin's team:**



**Groups opposing the Putin's team:**





V. Putin

S. Shoygu

I. Sechin

S. Chemezov

V. Volodin

S. Ivanov

G. Timchenko

Y. Kovalchuk

A. Rotenberg

S. Sobyanin

D. Medvedev



Candidates for Politburo 2.0 members

The Power Block

A. Bortnikov  
V. Kolokolcev  
Y. Chaika  
E. Shkolov  
A. Bastrikin  
V. Ivanov  
E. Murov  
V. Zolotova  
N. Patrushev  
M. Fradkov

V. Lebedev

The Political Block

A. Gromov  
D. Peskov  
Patriarch Kirill  
V. Surkov  
A. Kudrin  
A. Voloshin  
A. Chubaic

System opposition

V. Zhirinovsky  
G. Zuganov  
M. Prokhorov  
S. Mironov

Business

G. Gref  
P. Abramovich  
V. Yakunin  
A. Miller  
V. Potanin  
O. Deripaska  
M. Fridman  
A. Usmanov  
V. Vekselberg  
V. Alekperov  
A. Mordashev  
A. Kostin  
O. Sienko

The Technical Block (Central Committee Secretary)

I. Shuvalov  
E. Nabiullina  
V. Kozhin  
D. Kozak  
S. Lavrov  
A. Vaino  
A. Belousov  
V. Khristenko  
  
S. Narishkin  
V. Matvienko

Regional Leaders

A. Beglov

R. Kadirov

R. Minnikhanov

A. Khloponin


Y. Trutnev





In previous "Politburo 2.0" reports, the orbits of Russian authorities were represented on a bipolar coordinate system with two poles of elite attraction (Igor Sechin, the leader of the *siloviki* government hardliners, and Dmitry Medvedev, the leader of the "system liberals").

Now, due to a significant weakening of the liberal authorities, it is more appropriate to use a sectoral chart (see below pie chart "Orbits of the Russian authorities").





- ❑ The areas of President Vladimir Putin's special personal control are the energy sector, foreign policy, defense and the defense industry, and law enforcement agencies.
- ❑ Responsibility for domestic politics, social policy, the financial sector and infrastructure projects is distributed among the Politburo 2.0 members.



## Inside «Politburo 2.0»

- ❑ The dismantling process of the duumvirate elements from the period of Medvedev's presidency in 2008-2012 is completed;
- ❑ By 2013 ex-president Medvedev became a technical prime minister with limited terms of reference primarily centered around the social unit;
- ❑ Alternative to the new position of Dmitry Medvedev has publicly delineated - the transition into the "experts" category;
- ❑ The new position, as noted in our 2014 reports "On the Eve of the Elite Groups' Reboot" and "Year of the Medvedev Government," facilitates his survival as Prime Minister;
- ❑ It is important to note that the influence of his longtime key opponent in the apparatus, Igor Sechin, has diminished in a parallel manner. Sechin's role as the counterweight to the strong figure of Dmitry Medvedev is no longer in demand.



- ❑ The reduction of resource potential among the groups who tried to position themselves as communicators with foreign elites and supporters of the "liberal" ideology.
  
- ❑ New types of resources requested by Putin:
  - Symbolic image;
  - Contacts with alternatives to the foreign players;
  - Grassroots support.

Level	SIGNIFICANT GROWTH OF INFLUENCE	STABILITY	DECREASE IN INFLUENCE
Politburo 2.0 members	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ S. Shoygu</li> <li>▪ S. Ivanov-C. Chemezov</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ G. Timchenko-Y. Kovalchuk</li> <li>▪ V. Volodin</li> <li>▪ I. Sechin</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ D. Medvedev</li> <li>▪ S. Sobyenin</li> <li>▪ Rotenbergs</li> </ul>
Candidates to the Politburo 2.0 members	<p>Power block (as a corporation)</p> <p>Financial triangle «Nabiullina-Gref-Kostin»</p> <p>A. Bortnikov</p> <p>R. Kadyrov</p> <p>Federal Protective Service (FSO)</p>	<p>«Krasnoyarsk Group»</p> <p>R. Minnikhanov</p>	<p>The Old Family</p> <p>«System Liberal Group»</p> <p>A. Kudrin</p>

Putin has created a checks and balances system among the elites within key areas and industries. In fact this has encouraged conflict pairs:

### In economics

- Sechin-Timchenko (energetics)
- Kovalchuks-Rotenbergs (infrastructure)
- Keynesian Group-Monetarism Group
- Triumvirate «Nabiullina-Gref-Kostin»-Belousov

### In the Power area:

- Kolokolcev-Shkolov
- Bastrykin-Chaika
- Patrushev-Bortnikov
- FSB-FSO

### Foreign Policy:

- Lavrov-Ushakov

- ❑ **Power in Moscow.** Participants: S. Sobyenin and his team against Elite Coalition. Winner: Elite Coalition;
- ❑ **Russian Academy of Science.** Participants: Chemezov, Medvedev, Kovalchuks. Winner: Kovalchuks;
- ❑ **Power in Saint-Petersburg.** Participants: Kovalchuks, Rotenbergs. Winner: Rotenbergs;
- ❑ **Bridge to Crimea.** Participants: Timchenko, Rotenberg. Winner: 50/50.





- ❑ Stable position of business that is close to Putin;
- ❑ All the sanction victims received and will receive compensation in the form of new orders and direct financial support in the banking sector;
- ❑ In essence, we have a new legitimization model of resource redistribution from one elite group to the benefit of others.


October 2014

	Ivanov	Shoygu	Volodin	Timchenko	Chemezov	Kovalchuk	Sechin	Rotenberg	Medvedev	Sobyanin	Total
Closeness to Putin	8	8	6	9	6	7	6	8	5	5	68
Informal influence	7	6	5	9	7	8	8	8	2	3	63
Finance	2	5	1	8	7	7	6	7	3	5	51
Regional elites	7	5	7	5	4	2	3	3	2	3	41
Formal administrative	8	4	5	1	4	4	2	2	5	4	39
Media	4	4	8	2	3	7	1	1	3	4	37
Symbolic & Image resources	4	8	4	2	3	1	3	0	2	3	30
Political & party resources	3	3	8	1	3	1	1	0	5	1	26
Law enforcement resources	4	6	1	1	4	1	3	1	1	2	24
External resources	4	1	0	5	2	2	4	1	2	0	21
<b>2014 Total</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>400</b>


Politburo 2.0 member	August 2012: position in the Politburo 2.0	January 2013: position in the Politburo 2.0	January 2014: position in the Politburo 2.0	October 2014: position in the Politburo 2.0
Medvedev	1	1	7-9	9-10
Sechin	2	9	7-9	7
Ivanov	3	2	1	1
Chemezov	4	3	4-6	4-5
Volodin	5	4	2-3	3
Kovalchuk	6	7-8	4-6	6
Timchenko	7-8	6	4-6	4-5
Sobyanin	7-8	7-8	10	9-10
Shoygu	n/a	5	2-3	2
Rotenberg	n/a	n/a	7-9	8




Politburo 2.0 ranking: 9-10  
(far from Putin)  
\*not sanctioned




Ranking: 9-10  
\*not sanctioned




Ranking: 8  
\*under US and EU sanctions




Ranking: 7  
\*under US sanctions




Ranking: 6  
\*under US and EU sanctions




Ranking: 4-5  
\*under US and EU sanctions



Ranking: 4-5  
\*under US sanctions




Ranking: 3  
\*under US and EU sanctions






Ranking: 2  
\*not sanctioned



Ranking: 1  
\*under US sanctions





- ❑ We can observe overheating inside the Politburo 2.0;
- ❑ Resource amount concentrated in the hands of Politburo members is increasing. This includes both power and economic resources;
- ❑ At the same time, the amount of distributable resource is decreasing;
- ❑ In this regard a “cleaning” inside the Politburo 2.0 (at least at the candidate level) is inevitable. The situation with Evtushenkov demonstrates that.



Silovik?



Sergey Ivanov  
(head of Presidential Administration)



Sergey Shoygu  
(Minister of defence)

Technocrat?



Sergey Sobyenin  
(Mayor of Moscow)



Rustam Minnikhanov  
(head of Tatarstan)

Liberal?



Alexey Kudrin  
(Former Deputy Prime Minister)



German Gref  
(CEO, Sberbank)



Alexey Kudrin  
(Ex-Deputy Prime Minister)

- 1) Factor of 1997;
- 2) Still has his people in the government;
- 3) Kudrinomics?
- 4) A lot of opponents in power camp;
- 5) Not very popular and never was.





Alexey Navalny  
(former Moscow mayoral candidate )

- 1) A tool for the fight between ruling elite;
- 2) Was close to *siloviki* group;
- 3) Criminal cases;
- 4) Populist and nationalist with connections in liberal camp and the West.



## Mikhail Khodorkovsky (ex-Yukos owner)

- 1) Business experience;
- 2) Strong character;
- 3) Money;
- 4) Oligarch;
- 5) Mistake with Ukraine.





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